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Article 2

By Judge Eric E. Younger*

The Sheppard Mandate Today:
A Trial Judge's Perspective
I.

INTRODUCTION

Writing an article on the relationship between the judiciary and
the press is an unhappy task for a trial judge. With few exceptions,'2
the milestones in this subject matter range from the unfortunate
to the embarrassing. 3 When a judge is confronted with a potential
publicity case, the most solace he is likely to receive from looking
at the efforts of his similarly situated predecessors is that they are,
by and large, easy acts to follow.
But it's easier to criticize than to explain the legal system's handling of the crises that arise in highly publicized cases. Why do
judges handle conflicts between the sixth and first amendments so
badly? The three fundamental answers are (1) the rarity of publicity cases, (2) the lack of practical power of the judiciary, and (3)
the vagueness of the Sheppard mandate.
II. DEALING WITH PUBLICITY CASES
A. Rarity of Cases
The first answer is abundantly simple and consists of an understanding of just how rare the so-called "publicity case" is.
A definition of the term "publicity case" as it will be used in this
article is in order. Such cases are almost exclusively criminal alJudge, Municipal Court, Los Angeles Judicial District. B.A. 1965,
University of Southern California; LL.B. 1968, Harvard University.
Member, ABA Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free
Press.
1. Cooperation between bench and media characterized part of the
Watergate litigation. In United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639
(D.D.C. 1975), Judge Gesell went to some length to assist the press in
reporting the momentous events that were the subject of the trial of
President Nixon's highest assistants.
2. An example of good-faith overreaction to what many would call a
"gag-order fad" is provided by the criticized order of a competent
judge in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225
(2d Dist. 1973).
3. One of the most extreme orders in recent history was the subject of
United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972), which vacated
a district court order prohibiting the publication of news of events
occurring in federal court during trial.
*
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though there are occasional exceptions. 4 The cases become nationally, or at least regionally, notorious because of the status of their
dramatis personae (e.g., Patty Hearst) 5 or because of the luridness
of the crime (e.g., Richard Speck and the Chicago nurses' murders)
or because of the combination of the two factors (e.g., the killing of
Sharon Tate, et al., by Charles Manson). But the case of acute local
interest such as when a government official is accused of bribery or
sexual misbehavior must also be included. While generally not attended by major regional or national publicity, and while often involving relatively minor charges (drunk driving trials of famous
personages being prime examples) all the publicity issues, excepting those related to physical security of the court and its personnel,
may be presented to the trial judge.
Even given this rather broad definition of "publicity cases" their
rarity is striking. In Los Angeles County, California, the jurisdiction with which the author is the most familiar, there are 7,200,000
people whose cases and controversies are resolved by some 350 trial
judges of the superior, municipal and federal district courts.
While Californians are probably not really as bizarre as the media
would lead people in other parts of the country to believe, it must
be admitted that the Los Angeles area produces far more than its
proportional share of publicity cases. But there have been no more
than five which the author can recall in the past year. Each trial
judge in Los Angeles County, then, has about one chance in seventy
of seeing a publicity case in a given year and it doesn't take a mathematician to recognize that the average judge will, accordingly,
never handle a publicity case.
This rarity dictates that no trial judge will have any "experience" at dealing with such situations. Judges deal frequently with
fourth and fifth amendment issues and the better ones become quite
proficient at handling them, but no such proficiency can be expected with regard to first amendment issues. If practice makes
perfect, there is every reason to believe that judges will remain decidedly imperfect in this area although some assistance may be on
the way.
B. Lack of Judicial Power
The second factor which contributes to the judiciary's poor record in dealing with publicity cases is the fundamental lack of power
of the-bench to deal with this type of problem. It may seem prema4. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
5. See United States v. Hearst, CR 74364 WHO (N.D. Cal., Sept. 24,
1976).

JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS
ture to discuss power--"enforcement," if you will-before discussing the substantive aspects of orders restricting the flow of information in particular or the behavior of non-party participants in trials
in general, but assuming arguendo that such orders are sometimes
needed, a few judges, but only a few, have been confronted with the
question of what they can do about open defiance of such orders.
The answer, surprising to most people, is "very little."
When most students of the first amendment seek recent examples of judicial use of the contempt power to enforce restrictive orders, the name of William Farr comes to mind.6 Farr's problems
with Judge Charles Older, the Los Angeles Superior Court Judge
who presided ably over the trial of Charles Manson and three of his
female followers, relate not to the breaking of a restrictive order
but rather to the refusal to divulge the identity of an individual
who leaked certain grand jury minutes to him. After several years
and an abortive effort at a criminal trial of two of the potential
sources for perjury 7 no one has ever positively determined the
source of Farr's information.
Among journalists, Bill Farr is a patron saint. The reason for
this status is simple. During the course of Judge Older's use of the
contempt power to find out who had broken his order, Bill Farr
served nearly two months in the Los Angeles County Jail. This is
one of the longest terms of incarceration of any American reporter
for contempt, and there seems little question but that Farr and
most other aggressive reporters quickly would do another couple of
months over the same or similar principles.
Most contempt citations in restrictive order cases have, in fact,
arisen out of good faith efforts to test the applicable first amendment principles rather than any acrimonious ignoring of judicial
power. Several years ago, the District Attorney of Los Angeles
County intentionally went just beyond the boundaries of a restrictive order in a rather sensational murder case, but so clearly had endeavored to draft a statement violative of the order but not prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial that even the deliberately
challenged trial judge merely imposed a fine of $50 and stayed
execution. 8 The particular district attorney, long a foe of what he
believed to be the judicial tendency to respond to every highly
6. See generally Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976).

7. See People v. Bugliosi, A 308 882 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County,
Oct. 3, 1974); People v. Shinn, A 308 882 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles
County, Dec. 4, 1974).
8. See note 2 supra.
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publicized case with some new and more restrictive gag order,
freely admitted that he intended to use the case as a vehicle to get
the issue in front of the United States Supreme Court. While he
failed in this objective, a learned and comprehensive opinion in the
restrictive order area was produced by the California Court of
Appeal.9
More recent cases, including the well-known and rather amazing
United States v. Dickinson,10 have included only fines as penalties
for press contempts, notwithstanding that such cases involved more
serious contempts. In Dickinson, reporters intentionally published
an account of proceedings in a public courtroom although expressly
forbidden from so doing by the trial judge. The court's power to
render the contempt citation became the issue before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Three reasons for the weakness of the contempt power when
used against the press should be noted. First, judges are used to incarcerating criminals and are somewhat more comfortable in that
task than when incarcerating newsmen. Though many a judge has
had reason to jail an individual for contempt, it is usually for some
breach of the peace or outrageous behavior in the courtroom. This
is a far cry from locking up a newsman who may or may not be an
acquaintance of long standing of the judge, but who is probably acting in good faith, whether legally or not. Second, the trial judge in
proposing to cite a restrictive order violator for contempt, may anticipate that his order will be subjected to most rigorous appellate
scrutiny, if not summary reversal. Third, the "Farr" factor still remains the biggest power problem in that many reporters will readily and willingly go to jail if a jail term is threatened. They can do
so with the knowledge that the best counsel procurable in the
United States promptly will line up and file petitions and briefs to
Justices of the United States Supreme Court before the sheriff has
turned his key."
9. See Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 145, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225,
229 (2d Dist. 1973).
10. 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
11. A good example of the media's readiness to move forward in the
appellate courts was afforded in what ultimately became the Supreme
Court case of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
While the trial court's order was before the Supreme Court of
Nebraska in State ex rel. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 194 Neb.
783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), the petitioners applied to Mr. Justice
Blackmun, as Circuit Justice, for a stay. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319 (1975); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S.
1327 (1975) (reapplication for stay). All of the significant events in
the case before the Supreme Court of Nebraska and Justice Blackmun
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In short, then, the contempt power, long viewed as the power of

a judge to bring about an ordered result through the assertion of
the state's might, has far more symbolic and psychological than real
importance in the fair trial-free press areas. To make the point in a
slightly different way, it can be said that the sanctions flowing from
judicial decisions are traditionally efficacious only against litigants.
A criminal defendant may go to prison upon a determination of
guilt and a civil litigant may stand to lose money or other important
rights as a result of judicial power. The journalist or attorney running afoul of a publicity-oriented restrictive order, however, is not
within those traditionally sanctionable categories and is a target for
which the weaponry of judicial power is ill-designed.
C. The Confusing Sheppard Mandate
Though the rarity of publicity cases and the lack of effective judicial power to enforce restrictive orders may be parts of an explanation of why judges fare so badly in this arena, they are peripheral and rather simple. The third factor-the "Sheppard Mandate"-is neither. This factor gives rise to the entire law of restrictive orders and spawns its central complications.
But what is the "Sheppard Mandate?" It is little understood by
trial judges and less so by journalists. People from the bench, the
bar and the press who deal frequently with the fair trial/free press
subject matter have read and reread Sheppard v. Maxwe 1'2 a hundred times. Unfortunately, language in a Supreme Court case can,
like giving thanks before a meal or testifying to tell the truth, become routine enough that we forget what is being said. What most
judges and lawyers generally think Sheppard says is that if there
is a lot of publicity about a really gruesome murder case and the
judge is worrying about selecting a jury whose members haven't
heard of the case through the media, he can issue orders to lawyers and police not to talk about the case and order the news media
not to report anything about it.
The opinion was really about two related, but not identical, subjects. First, it dealt at length with mistakes the trial judge made
during the conduct of the trial itself. Second, it dealt with control
over the impact of pretrial publicity on the trial in general and on
the jury in particular. 13 What did the Supreme Court actually say?
had occurred between October 31 and December 2, a period of 33
days. The murder had been committed on October 18.
12. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
13. The assumption that judges are immune from press-generated prejudice perhaps deserves scrutiny. A footnote to the Sheppard opinion
notes:
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The [trial] court's fundamental error is compounded by the
holding that it lacked power to control the publicity about the
trial. From the very inception of the proceedings the judge announced that neither he nor anyone else could restrict prejudicial
news accounts....

Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts
must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the
duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of
course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting
events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat
abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury was something
the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial,
a new trial should be ordered. But . . .the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.14
What is clear from this language is where the buck stops. Twice
in one paragraph the Court stressed that the trial judge must take
steps to protect the trial against prejudicial outside influences. This
is the "Sheppard Mandate," but what, then, is so difficult about
complying with it?
To begin with, it imposes a burden almost unknown in our jurisprudence, the true sua sponte duty of a trial judge. The reader may
well say that that's not so unusual-that trial judges are often given
15
sua sponte duties in instructing juries, for instance. But such duties are, in reality, only nominally sua sponte, as one party or the

other virtually always wants the jury instructed on its function or
the burden of proof.
But the Sheppard Mandate is truly sua sponte because the trial
judge must discharge it and, conversely, may be in the position of
In an unsworn statement, which the parties agreed would
have the status of a deposition, made 10 years after Sheppard's conviction and six years after [the trial judge's] death,
Dorothy Kilgallen asserted that Judge Blythin had told her:
"It's an open and shut case . . . he is guilty as hell." It is
thus urged that Sheppard be released on the ground that the
the judge's bias infected the entire trial.
384 U.S. at 358 n.11.
For a recent look at the publicity-prejudice issue in a military
(nonjury) setting see Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975).
14. 384 U.S. at 357, 362-63 (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127 (West 1970).
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sole guardian of first amendment interests even against the express
wishes of both parties. It is a rare situation in which a trial judge's
decision on any issue enjoys the support of both parties all the way
through United States Supreme Court argument and is unanimously reversed. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart1 6 was, of
course, such a case.
This, from the trial judge's point of view, is a uniquely difficult
burden. We have travelled a long way as a nation on the adversary
system's road, and leaving it can lead to a bumpy and obscure path.
The judge, in our system, is to do independent research, to be sure,
and not facilely rely on the briefs of the parties. Often they both
miss the heart of the matter as he sees it, but rarely is he expected
to go counter to their mutual points of view, except on such mundane administrative or economic issues as continuances.
Emotionally and intellectually, the burden on a trial judge who
is asked to go counter to the wishes of a defendant in a capital case
on a major constitutional point where the State joins in the defense
position is almost unbelievable. Any judge with courage is accustomed to risking reversal on a "tough call" where he thinks he is
right, but here we ask him to run with the bulls at Pamplona with
swim fins on. He might still win, but he would have designed the
contest differently if he had been consulted in advance.
A second major problem of the Sheppard Mandate is its vagueness as to the power of the judge. Some analysts point to its implicit acknowledgment that direct action against the press is possible. In speaking of an inflammatory editorial critical of the defense's legal tactics, the Court said, "The article was called to the attention of the court but no action was taken." 17 What "action"
could the court have taken, one wonders? Or, speaking of inaccurate coverage, what is the meaning of the statement "the judge
should have at least8 warned the newspapers to check the accuracy
of their accounts"?'
On balance, however, the most honest characterization of the direct restraint issue is that the Court tantalizingly hinted at it as a
possibility 19 and failed to say that direct restraint is forbidden when
it plainly had the opportunity. Note that several times it even
quoted with implicit disapproval 20 the trial judge's statements that
he was unable to control the press directly. Students of the opinion
16. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
17. 384 U.S. at 346.
18. Id. at 360.
19. See id. at 350.

20. See id. at 357.
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wondered for a decade whether the crack left in the door was real
or imaginary. It is now clear that it was intended to be real, 21 but
narrow enough to shed very little light.
It should be borne in mind that the criminal justice setting is
critical here. The Supreme Court has expressly indicated the possibility of direct prior restraint of the press in the national security
22
context.
But, if there is a mandate to the trial judge and yet his potential
for directly restraining the press is questionable, what suggestions
does the Supreme Court make? With all due respect, the justices'
traditional lack of trial court service (commendably remedied by
the author of the Sheppard opinion, Justice Clark, after retiring
from the Court) is abundantly clear in the proffered list, which is
23
treated with amazement, anger or laughter by trial judges.
The Court listed continuances, changes of venue, jury sequestration and new trials as "palliatives," but indicated that "the cure lies
in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. '' 24 Several of the "remedial measures" plainly relate to the
conduct of the trial itself 25 and are not the subject of this article.
What is very much its subject, and the subject of the overwhelming
majority of the literature in this field, is the assertion that "the
court should have made some effort to control the release of leads,
information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses,
26
and the counsel for both sides."
This latter assertion was, as a practical matter, the birth of the
"gag order" as the press and bar generally call it. It is important
to note that this terminology is also used to describe the far less
common but constitutionally more onerous order directly restraining the press from publishing information it has received.2 7 The
Court did provide some guidelines:
21.

See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1976).

22. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971).
23. The author has observed the indicated responses while addressing two
separate groups of judges at the National College of the State Judiciary, in Reno, Nevada.

24. 384 U.S. at 363.
25. These include restriction of the media from certain areas of the
courtroom, restrictions on the handling of exhibits by newsmen and
on conduct within the court, and the insulation of witnesses from one
another and from news accounts of the case. Id. at 358-61.
26. Id. at 359.
27. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976); cf. United
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931).
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[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which
divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to

submit to interrogation or take any lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the identity of prospective
witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the case ....
[T]he court could also have requested the appropriate city and

county officials to promulgate a regulation with respect to dissemination of information about the case by their employees. 28
In addition, the Court implied that the voir dire examination of
the jurors could have been better.2 9 Not much is made of the issue

in the Sheppard holding, but the Court has stressed the importance
a pretrial prejudice-reducer ever since the trial of
of voir dire3 as
0
Aaron Burr.

What makes the proffered measures so unsatisfactory? After
all, we have just noted six suggestions which in no way require direct prior restraint of the press.
Turning first to the list of "pallatives," we find the Supreme
Court of the United States in the curious position of endorsing continuances, probably the most universally agreed-upon villain of the
court administration process, 3 1 and one which, especially without
the consent of the defendant, is expressly forbidden by statute in
many states 32 and, now, in the federal system as well. The last
measure which a legal system conscious of its image needs is to attempt to create fairness in its most celebrated cases by keeping
them around for long periods of time.
The second suggestion, change of venue, makes sense in some
cases. As previously noted, there is a category of cases in which the
publicity is intense but highly geographically localized. The public
official allegedly caught in an illegal homosexual episode or driving
under the influence is an excellent example, and his trial may be in
a more dispassionate setting some distance from his home area.
There are, however, at least three problems with venue changes.
The really sensational criminal case, given the pervasiveness of
modern media and the incredible tendency of some of our most sensational crimes to occur on live television, simply is not geographi28. 384 U.S. at 361.
29. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 345 (1966).
30. See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49 (No. 14,692g) (C.C. Va.
1807); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
31. See, e.g., ABA A.DvisoRY COMM. ON THE CRiNnAL TRIAL, STANDARuS
§ 1.3 (1968); NATIONAL ADVISORY COM1IsSION ON CRimNAL JUsTcE STANDARDS AND GOALS, ComRTs, Standard 4.12
RELATING TO SPEEy TRIAL

(1973).
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970); 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1970).
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cally manipulable.83 If Lee Harvey Oswald had lived, would his defense have been an easier task in San Antonio than Dallas? Would
Jack Ruby have fared better in Houston, or, for that matter, in Anchorage? In case after case, it is recognized that change of venue
does little for the really notorious defendant. Second, many states
have statutes prohibiting changes to counties other than those surrounding the county in which a crime occurs. In trying Simants for
the infamous Lincoln County, Nebraska, murder of the Kellie family, Judge Stuart fully comprehended this difficulty. He noted that
Lincoln County was by far the largest of the legal possibilities, and
that all of the others were in the same media area.8 4 Even though
these statutes' constitutionality has been put in serious question, 35
requiring a trial court to proceed in flat contravention of applicable
statutes in a case wherein the whole world may be watching is asking quite a bit. Last, but by no means least, is the expense factor,
a dramatic one for a rural county and a substantial one for even a
good-sized jurisdiction. 6
Jury sequestration, while an important tactic for the judge to
employ in publicity case situations, does little to reduce the impact
of pretrialmaterial, and, moreover, reduces substantially both the
number and desirable cross-section of people who realistically can
be expected to serve on trial juries. This reduction is surely contrary to the modern trend to increase the broadness and representa7
tive quality of jury panels.3
The Supreme Court's last "palliative" is that of granting a new
trial. This remedy is totally illusory, and merely goes to say that
mistakes in this area need not be fatal. Suffice to say that in terms
33. See People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 177, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265,
310 (2d Dist. 1976).
34. Telephone interview by the author with Judge Hugh Stuart, July 18,
1976.
35. See Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
36. Contra Costa County, California, an affluent county of 500,000 persons, was faced with trying the case of People v. Remiro, A 320 019
(Super Ct., Los Angeles County, Aug. 9, 1976), on a change-of-venue
basis, because of publicity surrounding the defendants, self-proclaimed
members of the Symbionese Liberation Army. Judge H. Ross Bigelow,
who presided at the trial, informed the author on September 16, 1976
that the cost to Contra Costa County for the trial was approximately
$500,000.
37. Note, for example, the broadness of the provisions on jury panels in
the amendments, effective in 1976, of the California statute that virtually eliminates categorical excuses from service. See CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 200 (West Supp. 1976). See also ABA ADvWSORY Comm. ON THE
CRnvINAL TRIAL, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL By JURY

§ 2.1 (1968).
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of dollar cost of the "publicity trial" and the loss of public confidence attendant upon holding a new trial for any reason other than

a hung jury, the remedy is probably worse than the disease.
Voir dire may not sound like an important addition to the list,
but may be the most effective remedy short of the "gag order." Most
laymen probably understate the importance of voir dire, but effective lawyers and judges know that it can have tremendous impact
in the hands of talented practitioners. Many attorneys, especially
in the criminal and personal injury fields, get reputations for winning their cases during voir dire. It should be emphasized that a
trial judge who is willing to encroach on that distance which the
robe and bench tend to put between him and the jurors can not only
question jurors with pretty fair efficacy, but, more important, can
also educate them as to the need to reject certain influences. An
explanation of the difference between questions of fact and law, and
the reasons for unswerving allegiance to the trial judge's decisions
on the latter as they relate to appellate review can have tremendous
impact on jury room deliberation. Such explanations should and
can be in nonlegalistic, everyday language, and can go a long way to38
ward impressing appellate courts with the fairness of a jury panel.
III. USE OF GAG ORDERS
But what of the gag orders? We are using the term, for the moment, to refer to those orders against parties, witnesses, court personnel and attorneys that amount to "censorship at the source,"
rather than those directing that the press not print.
A.

Impact of Sheppard

Sheppard, as noted above, suggested that such orders may be
used, whenever there is a "reasonable likelihood that prejudicial
news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial."8 9 Experts often point
to the fact that the widely criticized "reasonable likelihood" language, anathema to the press as appearing to be a dramatically
lower standard than the "clear and present danger" test of traditional first amendment free speech cases, 40 goes to the previously
mentioned list of "palliatives" rather than to the gag order suggestions. This point is true as far as it goes, but fails to perceive that
the gag order suggestion is clearly the one preferred by the Sheppard Court as it is set apart from the unenthusiastically recom38. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
39. 384 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918).
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mended "palliative" list. Is it possible that the Court would require
a higher standard of danger for using the preferred remedy than for
using those about which it is admittedly unenthusiastic? One may
suggest that the standard-of-proof issue was not paramount in the
minds of the Justices or even that the standard might be different
today if the same question were reexamined, 41 but it seems unrealistic to argue that the "reasonable likelihood" test does not apply
to the gag order suggestions.
Sheppard immediately became the focus for a great deal of
bench, bar and press activity, almost all directed at the gag order
suggestions. The most significant result of that activity was the
Reardon Report named for the Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court who chaired the American Bar Association
committee on the subject, and the 1968 American Bar Association's
42
Standards Relating to FairTrial and Free Press.
The ABA Standards contain four basic sections which relate to
the conduct of attorneys, the conduct of law enforcement officers
and court employees, the judicial proceedings themselves, and the
use of the contempt power. The first two sections contain identical
proscriptions against the release of six types of information: (1)
the accused's record and character, (2) confessions, (3) tests or refusals to submit to them, (4) identity and other details about witnesses other than the victim, (5) possibility of a plea and (6) opinions as to guilt. By contrast, the law enforcement agency provisions expressly permit the divulgence of certain matters such as the
fact and circumstance of arrest, the names of the officers, the nature
of the charges and physical evidence and requests to the public for
assistance.
The ABA Standards section relating to attorneys' conduct recommends "reprimand or suspension from practice" 43 for violations,
41. As authority, the author can only cite dozens of conversations, most
of them informal, with experts in this field, along with testimony at
the October 1975 hearings of the ABA Legal Advisory Committee on
Fair Trial and Free Press, on the then-proposed ABA Recommended
Court Procedure to Accommodate Rights of Fair Trial and Free Press,
in Washington, D.C. Considering the traditional acceptance of the
"clear and present danger" test, pressure in the press (and probably
in the legal) community for its adoption, and the absence of any
justification for the lower standard, adoption of the higher standard
would seem a likely result of re-examination by the courts.
42. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESs, APPROVED DRAFT (1968).

43. See id. § 1.3.
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and similar sanctions relating to law enforcement officers 44 and
court personnel. 45

In addition, since the promulgation of the ABA Standards,
"Bench/Bar/Media Agreements" providing statements of mutually
agreed proprieties in the coverage of major publicity trials have
been created in nearly half the states.46 Though surveys -have
shown that many individuals from all three disciplines have never
heard of the agreements even in the states in which they purport to
be in force, 47 it would be inaccurate to say that none of the agreements has improved relations between the institutions, or that no
crises have been averted. Media and legal professionals in the Seattle area, for example, point with pride to cooperative handling of
publicity case
situations which they believe would have been crises
48
elsewhere.

But it should be no surprise that the ABA Standards and state
Bench-Bar-Media agreements have become most famous by serving
as the content of gag orders. 49 Notwithstanding the efforts of the
American Bar Association's Legal Advisory Committee on Fair
Trial and Free Press, and of countless Bench-Bar-Media groups
across the country, the decade since Sheppard v. Maxwell has seen
a proliferation of gag orders in questionable situations and a resulting bitterness of the press toward the courts. 50
Some of the bitterness is justified, but part of it arises from the
press's lack of comprehension that a trial judge, once he has determined in his own mind what course of action the appellate cases dictate, must follow that course. It is difficult for the press to understand that a frank acknowledgment by a trial judge that a Supreme
Court opinion seems unwise does not entitle the trial judge to do it
his way instead of the Supreme Court's way if there is a conflict.
The use of the term "Sheppard Mandate" is, in part, an effort to emphasize this key difference between the trial judge, who must be
guided by the law as he intellectually perceives it rather than as he
would wish it and the reporter, whose only guide, in the last analysis, is himself. Most reporters in the United States have the highest
44. See id. § 2.1(d).
45. See id. § 2.3.
46. See ABA LEGAL ADViSORY Comm. ON FAIR TRiAL AND FREE PREss, FAIR
TPJAL/FREE PRESS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS 10 (1974).

47. Id. at 49-51.
48. See generally id. at 10.
49. Landau & Roney, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal,

62 A.B.A.J. 55, 59 (1976).

50. Id.
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of standards, but they should recognize that they, along with the
reading public and their editors, serve as their own supreme court.
An example will illustrate the point: Woodward and Bernstein's
All the President's Men 51 recounts the quandary faced by the authors when their investigations seemed to require the revealing of
one of their sources, an F.B.I. man, in a manner that would clearly
violate journalistic ethics, and would likely get the man fired. After some soul-searching, but, little reference to some equivalent of
the United States Supreme Court Reports, the reporter went ahead
and broke the rule knowingly.5 2 What judge hasn't been confronted
with a motion to suppress evidence which clearly has been seized in
a rather technical violation of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the fourth amendment by officers who were conscientiously trying
to do their duty. Hasn't every judge had to let a known narcotics
dealer "get off" through his decision in such a situation? The point
is not whether the reporter's decision to break the rule for a perceived higher goal is better or worse than the judge's to follow it.
The point is that law, in our society, requires that a judge or a narcotics officer or even the pedestrian whose progress is slowed by an
inconvenient red light adhere to rules of a different sort than the
ethics of the journalist. A clearer recognition by the journalist and
the judge that their opposites in the publicity case situation may be
marching conscientiously to the beat of a different drummer would
go a long way to improving understanding.
B.

ABA Due Process Proposal

But such understanding would clearly not make the problem go
away, so the ABA Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free
Press was asked by the American Bar Association to come up with
some solutions. The result of the Committee's work is the Recommended Court Procedure to Accommodate Rights of Fair Trial and
Free Press,53 which provides for the adoption, by a given court, of
standing guidelines and special orders. The two-step process and
the distinction between those two steps is the key to the ABA Procedure. The standing guidelines would be the generally agreed
standards of reportage and release of information applicable to
criminal trials, but would be merely of the ethically compelled or
advisory variety, not enforceable by a contempt order. Though
51. R. WOODWARD & C. BENSTEwn, ALL THE PREsENT'S MEN (1974).

52. Id. at 190.
53. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, RECOMMED COURT PROCEDURE TO Acco MoDATE RiGHTS OF FAiR TRIAL Am
FREE PRESS (1976).
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members of the press would probably have it otherwise, it is likely
that many courts would turn to the ABA Standards for their guidelines, albeit perhaps with some modification. But only in the extreme case, where a trial judge has determined the necessity therefor, should the second part, the special order, be put into effect.
Not only disclaiming a position on the question of when a special order is necessary, the Committee stated:
A few caveats are necessary. First, by recommending the procedure for adoption of standing guidelines and special orders, the
committee wishes to stress that it does not intend to recommend
or encourage the use of judicial restrictive orders.5 4
The distinction between guidelines, which are statements of
what is desirable, and the special order, which is enforceable and
specifically tailored to a particular publicity case situation, should
get courts away from the presently extant and probably unwise situation in which general rules, purporting on their face to be enforceable by the contempt power but in fact virtually never enforced and unknown to the bar if not the bench, are on the books
in a great many places, including virtually all federal courts. 55
The most important feature of the ABA Procedure, however,
would appear to be what its initial draftsman, Supreme Court correspondent Jack C. Landau, refers to as "due process for the press":
The proposal provides essentially that any interested party,
including news media personnel, be given notice and an opportunity to be heard either before a court enters an order concerning
pretrial and trial publicity of criminal proceedings or in the event
of an emergency ex parte order, immediately thereafter. Expedited judicial review should be provided before the issues involved
become moot. The proposal also requires the court to set forth
facts and reasons to explain the necessity for a proposed restrictive order.56
The proposal should have value, but a large segment of the press
is still adamantly against it, as it would be against any statement by
the American Bar Association short of one that the first amendment
bars any "censorship," either direct or at-the-source, of the reporting of criminal trials. 7 Other segments of the press seem reasonably satisfied with the proposal as, at least, a good faith effort.58
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at Preamble.
Landau &Roney, supra note 49, at 56.
Id. at 60.
Id.
See id. at 59; note 41 supra. The Southern California Radio and Television News Directors Association, for example, passed a resolution
and directed it to the ABA hearings, see note 41 supra, expressly
endorsing the ABA Procedurein material part.
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One value that the ABA Procedurehas is not related to diffusing
the press-bench controversy. It provides something of a cookbook
on how to handle a publicity case in which the Sheppard Mandate
seems to the trial judge to be applicable. Notwithstanding that the
10:00 a.m.-to-3:30 p.m. day, often alleged to be that of the judge, is
in most cases utter nonsense, it can at least be said that most court
business is transacted during the daytime. The Sheppard Mandate
has an uncanny habit of striking a trial judge at 3:00 a.m. on a Sunday and requiring decisions in a matter of minutes. In the true
publicity case, the maxim "not to decide is to decide" applies.
C.

The Nebraska Press Case

The procedure also has a sense of logic to it. District Judge
Hugh Stuart, of Lincoln County, Nebraska, when confronted with
the obviously extreme publicity case issues of the Kellie murders,
was also confronted with an already extant gag order imposed by
the local magistrate. In that respect, Judge Stuart was in a slightly
different position than the judge confronted with the initial emergency. Nebraska's legal requirement5 9 and practice of holding a
really prompt preliminary hearing very quickly put the ball in
Judge Stuart's court (the pun, for which apology is offered, being
almost unavoidable here). Judge Stuart felt the initial order overbroad and narrowed it.
Judge Stuart, whose ability to discuss the Simants case frankly
with the author was circumscribed by the pendency of the appeal
of the murder case, was honestly seeking the points of view of all
interested parties prior to the reforming of the gag order. Though
this article is not intended to go into the necessity for the order in
the first place, it can be said that the factors present in the Simants
case (i.e., an unusually brutal murder of an entire family, a small
county jury pool size, a pervasive although short-lived climate
of terror, confessions, and immediate media coverage) make as
good a case for an order as is ever likely to exist, with the possible
exceptions of Presidential assassinations or their close kin (e.g., Sirhan's assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy). Judge Stuart
has, understandably, become an expert in this area by now and cannot realistically sort out the extent to which the ABA Proposal itself, of which he was aware, influenced him to consult with press
people and make findings about the extent of publicity, the potential for prejudice, and the need for restrictive orders prior to his
taking final action. 60
59. NE. R-v. STAT. § 29-504 (Reissue 1975).
60. See note 34 supra.
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Judge Stuart's order was of the most extreme kind-a direct
prior restraintagainst the press's printing of certain material. The
battle was immediately joined and, if he thought the press coverage
of the murder itself was massive, it must have seemed halfhearted
by comparison to the publicity flowing from state and national media after the order. After a hearing in which the initial magistrate
had testified and various news clippings had been taken into evidence, Judge Stuart held that "there is a clear and present danger
that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the defendant's right to
a fair trial."' 61 Accordingly, he specifically barred the reporting of
(1) defendant's confessions to law enforcement officers; (2) defendant's statements to others; (3) the contents of a note written by the
defendant the night of the crime; (4) certain medical evidence; (5)
the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault; and (6) the exact nature of the order itself6 2 (an
odd-sounding, but probably necessary, addition).
Leaving the exact nature of the Alphonse/Gaston courtesies between the Supreme Court of Nebraska and Justice Blackmun to
other articles, it can be said that the order was pared down by the
state supreme court to include only confessions and other facts
"strongly implicative" of the defendant.6 3 The order was carefully
limited in time; it expired by its own terms when the jury was impaneled and sequesteed.
Other articles have covered the United States Supreme Court
opinion in the case extensively; this one will not. Suffice it to say
that a unanimous6 4 Court reversed the Nebraska supreme court's
decision to uphold at least parts of the trial court's order.
The question that everyone wanted answered was "Can a direct
order against the press ever be upheld in the criminal justice setting?" The answer lies buried somewhere in the five opinions. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall answered the question "no,''
and Justice White said he thought he agreed. 66 The main opinion
61.
62.
63.
64.

96 S. Ct. at 2795.
Id.
See id. at 2796.
When the author was attempting to reach Judge Stuart by longdistance telephone, he first encountered Mrs. Stuart, an articulate and
pleasant woman, who indicated that she and Judge Stuart had
always known that the United States Supreme Court might overturn
the order because of the complexity, importance, and uncertainty of
the issues. Her only real complaint, a perfectly reasonable one for
any judge's wife, was, "Did they have to make it unanimous?"
65. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1976) (concurring opinion).
66. Id. at 2808 (White, J., concurring).
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of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist still
tantalizes the scholar and trial judge with statements that the first
amendment's rights are not absolute ones. The opinion thus left
open the possibility of prior restraint being proper in some cases,
but agreed with Justice Powell6 7 that Simants was not that case.
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, only one paragraph in
length, makes one of the most interesting side-points by agreeing
with the "absolute" position of the Brennan opinion, with the possible exception of cases in which information was gained by "shabby
or illegal" means or
was "demonstrably false" and published for a
"perverse" motive. 68 Quaere, hasn't Justice Stevens described the
facts of Sheppard v. Maxwell perfectly?
The main opinion has to have hurt Judge Stuart emotionally. He
tried faithfully to comply with the Sheppard Mandate and considered all of the "palliatives," rejecting each one for perfectly logical
reasons. His "failure," in the last analysis, was in not expressing, in
writing, findings which caused the rejection of each. 69 The feeling
must be like the members of a championship team finding out at the
end of the season that one of its players was academically ineligible.
But forgetting post-mortems, what is the status of the Sheppard
Mandate today? What is the impact of the post-Sheppard cases, the
ABA Procedure, and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart on the
duty of the trial judge?
Supreme Court and court of appeals cases have answered some
questions, although they are considered far more exhaustively elsewhere.70 The assumption of many defendants which Charles Manson demonstrated by displaying to the jury a headline trumpeting
a purported Presidential declaration of his guilt, is that if one becomes famous enough he becomes untriable. This assumption was
expressly rejected in Murphy v. Florida.71 That the media have
standing to raise first amendment issues not affecting the parties
themselves is well settled.7 2 The free speech (not press) rights of
participants, including attorneys, must be considered in any court
rules designed to prevent prejudice or accomplish other goals.78
Significantly, the power of the courts to deal with perceived
abuses of their processes through the use of the contempt power has
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See id. at 2807.
See Landau & Roney, supra note 49, at 59.
421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
72. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1975).
73. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir.
1975).

JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS
been re-endorsed in a case where the legal position of the trial court
was most questionable.7 4 We are given, in United States v. Dickinson, a reminder that an order of a court of competent jurisdiction
is to be obeyed or tested legally, not ignored, regardless of the bona
fides, or even the legal accuracy, of the respondent's doubts.7 5
Through all, there has been no inroad on the Sheppard Mandate
itself. The Nebraska Press Association case impinges on only one
mechanism for implementing it. All of the duties of the trial court
discussed at the outset of this article persist.
Any order the trial judge makes in an effort to limit pretrial
publicity must be accompanied by an expansive record and findings
of fact regarding the potential of publicity to deny the accused a fair
trial. While the Nebraska Press Association case itself deals only
with direct restraint, the experience of the last decade is that any
restrictive order waves a red flag, and encourages deliberate and
carefully conceived
challenge 76 and only slight hope of being upheld
71
on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
The Sheppard Mandate is clear enough, but the Supreme Court's
suggestions as to how to discharge the duty it creates are cloudy.
The platform offered by the Nebraska Law Review, from which
even a lowly trial judge can critically scrutinize the highest court
in the land, obligates the author to offer some suggestions based on
a reading of the cases, three years' service on the ABA Committee,
and the opportunity to run with the ball a time or two in publicity
case games (perhaps most significantly by handling the arraignment and certain pretrial motions in the case of People v. William
and Emily Harris78 the defendants being Patty Hearst's abductors
or associates, depending on when one asks).
An intellectual checklist for the judge handling a publicity case
includes the following points:
1. Do not try to restrain the press directly. The odds of a direct prior restraint passing appellate review are too small and life
is too short.
2. Begin with a presumption against any orders. The vast majority of publicity cases require none and the record, in terms of
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 513 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 513.
See note 2 supra.
See Landau &Roney, supra note 49, at 59.
A 321 099 (Super Ct., Los Angeles County, Aug. 9, 1976).
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the Sheppard Mandate, can be well protected by findings that
other methods can afford the defendant a fair trial. In that onein-a-million case, if a judge's own initial tendencies have been
against issuing pretrial publicity orders, and he ultimately decides
he must do so, he will have created tough enough hurdles for the
orders eventually made that they will likely pass appellate muster as well.
3. Hold a "hearing"even though the proceeding may be very
informal and at an odd hour. Even if it is unlikely that any order
will be issued, the trial or arraignment judge should make a record to show that the Sheppard Mandate was considered and consciously satisfied in his mind. The ABA Procedure, including the
use of standing guidelines (allowing persons attending the hearing to have a common knowledge base as to what the issues are
in advance), and notice to the relevant press, make excellent
sense here.
4. Make express findings. In line with items 2 and 3, findings
are required whether any orders are made or not. If orders are
made, the Nebraska Press Association kind of analysis (i.e., why
wouldn't less restrictive alternatives suffice?) will surely be used
to attack even nondirect restraining orders in the future. If orders are not made, the findings should be used to thwart reversal
of the case-in-chief on Sheppard grounds.
5. Admit considerable evidence. Several persons close to the
litigation have indicated to the author that part of the problem
faced in Nebraska Press Association was the failure of the court
to admit massive quantities of evidence, in the form of newspaper
clippings, transcripts of broadcasts, and perhaps even opinion
polls, to support the order. A sample may not be enough, so if
there is "massive" publicity, compile a massive evidence file.
6. Be certain that the "palliatives" and voir dire will be used
to their greatest possible effect. The initial judge in a multijudge or multi-level jurisdiction has the problem that certain
measures are not practically available to, or controllable by, him.
These measures may include change of venue, the subject of later
motions, or voir dire, not used until the trial itself. The initial
judge should, however, do all he can to guarantee the use of the
measures in Sheppard and to persuade subsequent judges handling the case to do the same. Though direct communication on
this issue between the judges may be ethically questionable, a
public on-the-record declaration should be made at the time the
case first reaches a court that thorough voir dire will help protect
the defendant.
7. Be cooperative with the press. A major problem is the mutual distrust in which the courts and the press often hold one an-
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other, especially in big cities. An overtly cooperative attitude on
the part of a judge can go further toward improving the propriety
of coverage of a crime and trial than is often imagined. 79 When
the court and press are able to work together to increase the public's knowledge, not only of the particular trial, but of the system
in general, progress is possible.
8. Consider physical planning. Remember that part of the
criticism of the trial court in Sheppard was the circus-like setting
of the trial, with reporters filling the counsel table area. The
ABA Committee and the National College of the State Judiciary,
in Reno, have made a list of excellent planning suggestions arising
out of the federal experience in Watergate and other situations
available to trial judges and court administrators.
9. Support good regulations and practices of law enforcement
agencies and court personnel. The key point is to be certain that
those agencies are aware of the ABA Standards or similar guidelines. Also, encourage them to be effective in disseminating
proper information concerning cases; this not only aids the
press in informing the public, but can also diffuse terrifying
rumors following a crime.
10. If an order is necessary, it should be as narrow as possible.
The item to which an order might most often (though rarely) be
properly directed seems to be a confession. This is likely to be the
area in which the balance between the dramatic prejudice to the
defendant and the press's rights and the public's right to know a
great deal about even the most sordid events is tipped most heav-

79. At the time of the September 1975 arraignment of William and Emily
Harris by the author, so many inquiries were coming in from the
press that it seemed advisable to permit reporters into chambers to
ask procedural questions about the two living "ring-leaders" of the
Symbionese Liberation Army. Personnel of the Los Angeles County
Marshal's Office, and the author at the beginning of the session with
the press, announced that only questions of a procedural nature would
be answered, and that the substance of the case involving the defendants themselves or Patricia Hearst, their celebrated alleged partner, would be off-limits. Approximately 30 members of the press
crowded into chambers and asked several questions, none of which
was inappropriate. Though no cause-and-effect relationship is
claimed, the author subsequently reviewed accounts of the initial
court proceedings in three major newspapers, two national news magazines, and on the three major television networks, and found no
significant errors in the reporting of that day's events. Reaction
from members of the press present at the in-chambers discussion was
good. It should be noted that neither the author nor any court attach6
issued any sort of release or made any sort of prepared statement.
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fly in the direction of the former. At the other extreme is the
"taste" issue. Judge Stuart's very understandable desire to protect the family and friends of the murder victims from accounts
of necrophilia and other shocking aspects of the Simants case was
a legal regulation of good taste pretty clearly proscribed by the
first amendment. In the last analysis, the media, not the courts,
are going to decide what the public should and shouldn't hear
when it comes to gruesome details.
11. Control the trial itself carefully and concentrate on voir
dire and instructions.

